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I.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are 20 years old. You live in a modest apartment in a low-income

neighborhood in New Jersey, splitting the rent with a roommate while you attend school and work
as many hours as your employer has available to make ends meet. You arrive home one day to
learn your roommate managed to pick up a new big-screen TV, and with football season around
the corner you are happy to help him mount it on the wall.
The next morning there is a knock on the door and two uniformed officers place you and
your roommate under arrest for possession of stolen property. Your bail is set at $2,500. Unable
to afford the cost, you are forced to sit in jail as you await trial. Weeks pass. Classes go unattended.
Shifts are missed at work. Prosecutors offer a plea deal that includes probation, but you are hesitant
to adopt a record for a crime that you never committed. Instead, you sit in jail for 4 months before
your roommate admits to having stolen the TV. You are subsequently released.
No crime was committed, but a price has been paid. Four months in prison likely cost you
your job, your good standing in class, and potentially your home—assuming rent went unpaid due
to a lack of income. You spent that time in jail not for a crime you were guilty of or a risk you
posed to the community, but because you could not afford the cost of bail. These collateral costs,
solely related to pre-trial detention, can be devastating for an individual, their future, their family,
and their community.
Now imagine the same circumstances except your parents are willing are willing to loan
you $2,500. You post bail, get released from jail, attend your classes, and make every shift of work
for the next four months. In the meantime, you are free and able to prepare to fight the charges
against you before the charges are eventually dropped. These scenarios involve the same
individual, the same charges, and the same bail amount- but one person could afford to pay to

1

avoid sitting in jail for months, and the other could not. Worse yet, under the cash-bail system
described here, a person charged with a much more serious, violent offense may have bail set at
one million dollars, but so long as they can put together that large sum of money they will not have
to sit in a concrete cell while they await trial.
Cash bail, in practice, is not informed by proper considerations and is an unfair, seemingly
arbitrary means of determining which offenders are detained pre-trial. The system’s
disproportionate discrimination against the poor and ethnic minorities has resulted in a decadeslong call for reform in the United States. Some states, including New Jersey in 2017, have enacted
bail reforms in effort to reduce an overcrowded prison population and curb discriminatory
practices in the justice system.1
Notably. analysis of the early returns of these implemented reforms will vary based on the
reader’s preconceived assumptions and goals regarding their implementation. Specifically, this
paper considers particular goals of reform, including (1) the reduction of New Jersey’s pre-trial
prison population, (2) curing socio-economic prejudice in pre-trial detention determinations, and
(3) addressing racial disparities in the pre-trial prison population. The initial data indicates that
New Jersey’s reforms have been effective in reducing the total population of pre-trial defendants
and limiting the impact of socio-economic status on detention determinations but has not
successfully impacted racial disproportionalities in the state’s pre-trial prison population.

1

Criminal Justice Reform Information Center, N.J. CTS., http://njcourts.gov/courts/criminal/reform.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2021).

2

II.

THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND CALLS FOR REFORM IN THE US

A. The History of Bail Reform in the United States
In the American colonies, presumptions favoring pre-trial release had been carried over
from England.2 “Personal sureties” from family or friends served to incentivize and ensure that the
accused party would abide by the conditions of one’s release and attend their court hearings at a
later date.3 After the Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, most states enacted their
own constitutions that included provisions for bail laws, including protections against “excessive
bail.”4
Later, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 which stipulated that for “all arrests in
criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death”, and established
judicial discretion in setting bail.5 Soon after, the Eight Amendment of the United States
Constitution, adopted in 1791, ordered that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required”, establishing
the right of the accused to have an opportunity for pre-trial release.6 Notably, the Supreme Court
extended this provision to the States and state-court defendants in 2019.7
In 1966 Congress passed the Bail Reform Act, which mandated that federal non-capital
case defendants should be released with the least restrictive conditions necessary to ensure their
appearance in court.8 The act also provided several factors for a judge to consider with respect to
conditions provided for a defendant’s release, including the accused’s family, community ties,
employment history, and past record of court appearances. 9 The Act also required the release of
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John-Michael Seibler and Jason Snead, The History of Cash Bail, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/the-history-cash-bail.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 33 (1789).
6 U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
7 Timbs v. Indiana , 139 S. Ct. 682, 689-690 (2019).
8 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)-(g).
9 Id.
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non-capital defendants unless the judge had specific reasons to believe they would not appear for
trial.10 Several states soon adopted their own, similar statutes. 11 Notably, none of this legislation
accounted for socio-economic concerns regarding the bail system.
Rising fears of crime nationwide led to Congress passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984.12
The Act allowed federal courts to detain arrestees pending trial where it is demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that no release conditions could reasonably assure the safety of the
community, rather than merely a showing that the defendant was a flight risk. 13 This law was
challenged in U.S. v. Salerno, where two men, including Salerno, had been charged under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 14 The government sought to detain
Salerno pre-trial, alleging that as the head of a powerful crime family, Salerno posed a threat to
community safety.15 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of detaining a defendant,
holding that there was no Eighth Amendment bar to the government “pursuing compelling
interests” such as public safety “through regulation of pre-trial release.”16 The Court also noted
that “Congress did not formulate the pre-trial detention provisions as punishment for dangerous
individuals”, and thus did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.17
Today, commercial bail has grown into a $2 billion industry as bond agents charge
exorbitant fees for helping keep defendants out of jail, with threats of being sent behind bars if

10

18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)-(g).
Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from Jail, Explained , VOX
(Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justiceinequality.
12 Id.
13 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
14 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743 (1987).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 753.
17 Id. at 747.
11
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payments are missed—further exacerbating the disparate impact this system has on those with a
lower socio-economic status.18 A system designed to provide financial incentives for the accused
to attend later court hearings has resulted in nearly half a million unconvicted people—
disproportionately poor people of color—sitting in jails simply awaiting trials.19
B. Rationales for New Bail Reform
The monetary bail system, in its current form, provides defendants claiming innocence only
two choices with respect to ensuring their pre-trial discharge: post the designated bail amount, or
arrange for a bond to secure their release from jail. Regardless of the crime committed or the
potential danger to the public, if a defendant can afford to post bail the defendant will be released
while awaiting trial. This methodology of release based on one’s ability to pay is an arbitrary and
unfair approach to pre-trial release that does little to incentivize defendants to appear in court, and
instead serves to “criminalize poverty”.20 Such a system would permit a wealthy person with
resources that could render them a flight-risk to be released after committing a serious crime while
a poor person sits in jail for a lesser offense, strictly based on the ability to post bail. This fact
reinforces the concept that cash bail judgments are not being informed by proper considerations.
Further, aside from the arbitrariness of using a defendant’s financial means to determine
their pre-trial release, studies have demonstrated that the likelihood of being assigned cash bail in
an initial arraignment can vary wildly from day-to-day and judge-to-judge.21 The decisions of

18

Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Shalia Dewan, When Bail Feels Less Like Freedom, More Like Extortion , N.Y.
Times, (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/us/bail-bonds-extortion.html.
19 Wykstra, supra note 11.
20 Mark. F. Bernstein, How New Jersey Made a Bail Breakthrough, Princeton Alumni Wkly. (Nov. 2020),
https://paw.princeton.edu/article/how-new-jersey-made-bail-breakthrough.
21 Anna Maria Barry-Jester, You’ve Been Arrested. Will You Get Bail? Can You Pay It? It May All Depend On Your
Judge., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jun. 19, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/youve-been-arrested-will-you-getbail-can-you-pay-it-it-may-all-depend-on-your-judge/. (A New York City study by the Legal Aid Society found that
defendants charged with a misdemeanor in 2017 had between a 2 and 26% chance of the judge setting cash bail for
release, depending on which judge was randomly assigned to the court on a given day. For felonies, the chances of
being assigned cash bail were anywhere between 30 and 69%).
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judges with respect to cash bail determinations have far reaching, downstream consequences for
defendants. Even a few days in jail can cost a person their job, their housing, or custody of
children.22 Defendants who are detained pre-trial and unable to post bail are more likely to be
convicted, either by trial or by plea deal—often times in effort to avoid further jailtime 23 —and
have a lower chance of being sentenced to probation rather than jail than those who are released.24
Notably, a Texas study found that “those who come from poorer zip codes were substantially more
likely to be detained than those from wealthier zip codes” at a rate of more than 2-to-1.25
Given the strain that a prolonged absence can have, financially and emotionally, on their
families, many poor defendants choose to plead guilty to the pending charges even if they are
innocent in order to secure release.26 While pleading provides temporary relief, the criminal record
that often results can subsequently negatively impact an individual’s future housing, employment,
and education prospects.27 As a result of these findings, critics have raised constitutional due
process and equal protection concerns with “a money bail system that selectively detains the
poor.”28
These socio-economic considerations also tie closely to racial disparities in the justice
system. A 2018 New Jersey study found that 42.8% of all high-poverty neighborhoods in the state
were majority-Black, and 35.9% were majority-Hispanic.29 New Jersey’s state population is only

22

Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial
Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev., 711, 713, (2017).
23 Id. at 714.
24 Id. at 750.
25 Id. at 737. (The authors note that is possible that the data reflects “differential offending by defendants from
lower-income zip codes”, including, potentially, more serious offenses that would lead to hire expectant bail
amounts).
26 Bernstein, supra note 20.
27 Pretrial Justice Reform, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION N.J.,
https://www.aclunj.org/theissues/criminaljustice/pretrial-justice-reform (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
28 Heaton, supra note 22, at 714.
29 William Stocovaz, The Geography of Poverty and Race in New Jersey, N.J. FUTURE (Oct. 2020),
https://www.njfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/The-Geography-of-Poverty-and-Race-in-New-Jersey-Oct2020.pdf.
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12.7% Black and 19.9% Hispanic.30 Notably, Black men compose 54% of those incarcerated in
New Jersey31 , and they are imprisoned at a rate more than 12 times that of white individuals in the
state.32 Another study found that neighborhoods with the highest incarceration rates were
predominantly Black and had high child poverty and male unemployment rates. 33 Laws targeting
lower income individuals—including cash bail systems—have downstream effects that
disproportionately harm some racial groups more than others.
Conversely, proponents of the monetary cash system—namely the $2 billion cash bail
industry, some prosecutors, and some law enforcement officials—stress that the posting of bail
provides a “financial incentive to make sure the person show[s] up for court” and claim that
criminals are no longer afraid to commit crimes “because they know at the end of the day, they’re
going to be released.”34 Others worry that the elimination of cash bail would lead to “dangerous
and violent offenders [being] cut loose from jails and shoved into communities where innocent
people suffer.”35

30

Stocovaz, supra note 29.
Joe Hernandez, N.J. Officials Finally Release Data on Bail Reform. Their Conclusion? It’s Working ,
WHYY.ORG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/n-j-officials-have-finally-released-data-on-bail-reform-theirconclusion-its-working/.
32 Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, New Jersey Has the Highest Black/white Youth Commitment/Detention Disparity Rate
in the Country, N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUST. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.njisj.org/institute.
33 Adam Looney & Nicholas Turner, Work and Opportunity Before and After Incarceration , THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Mar. 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf .
34 Sarah Wallace, ‘Nobody’s Afraid to Commit Crimes’: Cops, Victims Blast Overhaul of NJ Bail System,
NBCNEWYORK.COM (May 18, 2017, 8:56 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/bail-reform-newjersey-criminals-streets-law-jail-investigation/141250/.
35 Reuben Francis, New Jersey Is Proving That Bail Reform Works, TALK POVERTY (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://talkpoverty.org/2019/04/26/new-jersey-bail-reform-works/.
31
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III.

NEW JERSEY INSTITUTES BAIL REFORM

A. The Joint Committee on Criminal Justice
In 2013, the New Jersey Drug Policy Alliance conducted a study of the state’s jail
population.36 The study observed that on a given day, more than 1,500 people—12 percent of the
state’s total incarcerated population—were being detailed because they were unable to post bail of
$2,500 or less.37 More than half of that group was being held on an unpaid bail of less than $500.38
None of that group had yet been convicted of a crime. 39 Overall, nearly 75 percent of New Jersey’s
15,000 inmates were simply awaiting trial or sentencing. 40 Moreover, nearly 40 percent of the
state’s total prison population had the option to post bail but were financially unable to do so,41
and defendants were found to have been detained for an average of 314 days as they awaited trial.42
Additionally, the study also observed that 71 percent of the prison population was either Black or
Hispanic.43
Upon receipt of this report, New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Stuart Rabner
assembled the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice (“The Committee”) to consider reforms for
the state’s pre-trial justice system, including the monetary bail system.44 The Committee included
“representatives from the judiciary, the governor’s office, the attorney general’s office, the public
defender’s office, both houses of legislature, and nongovernmental officials such as private

36

Pretrial Justice Reform, supra note 27.
Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Diana Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out to Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results Are In., ARNOLD
VENTURES (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-jersey-set-out-to-reform-its-cash-bailsystem-now-the-results-are-in/.
41 Id.
42 Maddie Hanna, N.J. Rethinks Bail- Who Gets Out, Who Stays Jailed, Phila. Inquirer (Jan 1, 2017),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/local/20170101_N_J__rethinks_bail_ _who_gets_out__who_stays_jailed.html.
43 Admin. Office of the Cts., Report of the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice (Mar. 10, 2014),
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/finalreport3202014.pdf .
44 Bernstein, supra note 20.
37
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criminal-defense attorneys and The American Civil Liberties Union.”45 In 2014, the Committee,
with no dissenters, recommended comprehensive bail reform in New Jersey, which resulted in The
Criminal Justice Reform Act (“The Act”). 46
B. The Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA)
The Criminal Justice Reform Act passed in November 2014 and went into effect on January
1, 2017.47 The Act replaced New Jersey’s reliance on monetary bail, and instead allowed for
pretrial detention of defendants who present such a serious risk of danger, flight, or obstruction
that no combination of monetary bail or release conditions would be adequate to guarantee their
appearance in court.48 The Act promotes an “objective evaluation of each defendant’s risk level
and consideration of conditions of release that pretrial services officers will monitor.”49
Particularly, The Act sought to “rely primarily on ‘pretrial release by non-monetary means
to reasonably assure’ that a defendant will ‘appear in court when required,’ will not endanger ‘the
safety of any other person or the community,’ and ‘will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the
criminal justice process.’”50 Only with a finding of clear and convincing evidence that “no
condition or combination of condition” would achieve those goals may a court order a defendant
be held pending trial.51 Additionally, the legislation included a speedy trial provision, which stated
that, excluding time for reasonable delays, “defendants cannot remain in jail for more than 90 days
before the return of an indictment, or more than 180 days after indictment and before the start of

45

Bernstein, supra note 20.
Id.
47 Pretrial Justice Reform, supra note 27.
48 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1).
49 State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 54 (2017) (citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17).
50 Robinson, N.J. 44 at 55 (citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15).
51 Id.
46
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trial.”52 The Act also has a stated “fundamental mission . . . to ensure that all defendants are treated
equally under the criminal justice system, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender.” 53
Furthermore, The Committee anticipated that the proposed changes would reduce the
number of people detained pre-trial—an average of 9,000 a day—at least in half.54 The resulting
reduction in state costs—each pre-trial detainee is estimated to cost approximately $100 a day—
could also prove significant.55
C. The First 48 Hours
Under the Act, where a complaint-warrant is issued charging a person with an indictable
offense, the defendant “‘shall be temporarily detained to allow the Pretrial Services Program to
prepare a risk assessment and recommend conditions of release.”56 Prosecutors then present the
findings of the Pretrial Services Program’s risk assessment to the court. 57

Following this

assessment and presentation of findings the court must make a pretrial release decision for the
defendant within 48 hours after the eligible defendant’s commitment to jail.58 Defendants will
either be: (a) released on their own recognizance or on execution of an unsecured appearance bond;
(b) released on the least restrictive non-monetary condition or conditions to reasonably assure the
defendant’s appearance in court, the safety of any person or the community, and that the defendant
will not obstruct the criminal justice process; (c) released on monetary bail other than an unsecured

52

Robinson, 229 N.J. at 56 (citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(1)(a), (a)(2)).
Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D., Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J. JUDICIARY (Apr. 2019),
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=sT7 .
54 Kate Zernike, Panel Proposes Changes to New Jersey Bail System, N.Y. Times (Mar. 20, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/nyregion/panel-recommends-significant-changes-to-new-jersey-bailsystem.html.
55 Id.
56 Robinson, 229 N.J. at 55 ((citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(a)).
57 Id.
58 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(1).
53
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appearance bond; or (d) detained in jail, upon motion of the prosecutor, pending a pretrial detention
hearing.59
Notably, prosecutors are only able to seek detention of defendants under limited
circumstances. Prosecutors may only seek detention:
[W]hen an eligible defendant is charged with:
(1) any crime of the first or second degree enumerated under [N.J.S.A. 2C:437.2(d)];
(2) any crime for which the eligible defendant would be subject to an ordinary or
extended term of life imprisonment;
(3) any crime if the eligible defendant has been convicted of two or more offenses
under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection;
(4) any crime enumerated under [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2)] or crime involving human
trafficking pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8] or [N.J.S.A. 52:17B-237 et al.] when the
victim is a minor, or the crime of endangering the welfare of a child under N.J.S.A.
2C:24-4;
(5) any crime enumerated under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c);
(6) any crime or offense involving domestic violence as defined in [N.J.S.A. 2C:2519(a)]; or
(7) any other crime for which the prosecutor believes there is a serious risk that:
(a) the eligible defendant will not appear in court as required;
(b) the eligible defendant will pose a danger to any other person or the community;
or
(c) the eligible defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten,
injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate, a prospective
witness or juror.60
D. The Pretrial Detention Hearing
When a prosecutor applies to the court for pretrial detention for a defendant, that defendant
is held pending a hearing.61 At the hearing, the defendant has the right to counsel, to testify, to call
and cross examine witnesses who appear, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.62
Where there is no indictment, a prosecutor “shall establish probable cause that the eligible

59

Robinson, 229 N.J. at 55-56 (citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(2)(a -d)).
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a)).
61 Robinson, 229 N.J. at 57.
62 Id. at 58. (citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1)).
60
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defendant committed the predicate offense.”63 At the hearing, the court is permitted to take into
account:
a. The nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
b. The weight of the evidence against the eligible defendant, except that the court
may consider the admissibility of any evidence sought to be excluded;
c. The history and characteristics of the eligible defendant, including: (1) the
eligible defendant's character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community
ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and
record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (2) whether, at the time of
the current offense or arrest, the eligible defendant was on probation, parole, or on
other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an
offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state;
d. The nature and seriousness of the danger to any other person or the community
that would be posed by the eligible defendant's release, if applicable;
e. The nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the
criminal justice process that would be posed by the eligible defendant's release, if
applicable; and
f. The release recommendation of the pretrial services program obtained using a
risk assessment instrument under [N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 25].64
At the conclusion of the hearing, any order of detention by the court must be supported by
“clear and convincing evidence.”65 A judge’s order for a defendant to be detained pretrial must
also “include written findings of fact.”66 Conversely, if a judge orders a defendant to be released
contrary to the recommendation made in the pretrial risk assessment, the judge must explain their
reasoning in the order.67
E. Amendments to the Act- Broad Discovery in Pretrial Hearings
After the New Jersey Legislature instituted the Act, the New Jersey Supreme Court asked
the Committee to propose amendments to the court rules implementing the new law. 68 Among its

63

N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e).
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20.
65 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e).
66 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(a).
67 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2).
68 Robinson, 229 N.J. at 59.
64
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proposed amendments, the Committee recommended a broad discovery rule whereby a prosecutor
seeking pretrial detention “shall provide all relevant material in its possession” to the defendant.69
Dissenters within the Committee noted that a “complete discovery” requirement would be overly
burdensome for prosecutors, and proposed that prosecutors seeking detention should be required
to disclose “all statements or reports . . . that relate to the facts upon which the prosecutor relies in
these motions.”70 The Court eventually adopted a rule closer to the dissenter’s proposal, requiring
prosecutors seeking pretrial detention to “provide defendant with all statements or reports in its
possession relating to the pretrial detention application”, including the disclosure of all exculpatory
evidence, no later than 24 hours prior to the hearing.71
This rule is more favorable to defendants than federal law, as it provides defendants broader
discovery rights than does the federal system.72 In State v. Robinson, Chief Justice Rabner stated
that rule 3:4-2(c) requiring “broad discovery” where a prosecutor seeks pretrial detention is
justified because it sees that a defendant “accused of a crime and subject to possible detention is
better able to challenge the State’s application and presentation.”73
F. New Jersey’s Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool (The Public Safety Assessment (“PSA”))
To assist prosecutors and judges in determining whether to seek to detain or release a
defendant pretrial, the Act permits the use of a risk-assessment tool.74 The New Jersey Judiciary
adopted the Public Safety Assessment (“PSA”) as its objective risk-assessment tool.75 Designed
and developed by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation in 2013, the PSA uses a database of over
1.5 million cases from more than 300 jurisdictions in attempt objectively identify factors that that

69

Robinson, 229 N.J. at 60.
Id.
71 Id. at 60-61 (citing to N.J. Court Rules, R. 3:4-2(c)(1)(B)).
72 Id. at 61.
73 Id. at 68.
74 Dabruzzo, supra note 40.
75 Id.
70
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“best predict whether a defendant will be arrested for a new crime, be arrested for a new violent
crime, or fail to return to court” on their assigned date. 76 As an “objective” tool, the PSA “gives
no consideration to race, gender, education, socioeconomic status, or neighborhood.”77
Specifically, the objective risk-assessment tool considers nine factors to assess the likelihood of
pretrial success:
(1) The defendant’s age at current arrest;
(2) Whether the alleged crime is a violent offense, and if so, whether the defendant
is age 20 or older;
(3) Any additional pending charge(s) against the defendant at the time of the
current arrest;
(4) Any prior misdemeanor convictions on the defendant’s record ;
(5) Any prior felony convictions on the defendant’s record;
(6) Any prior violent convictions on the defendant’s record ;
(7) Failures to appear in court in the past two years;
(8) Failure to appear in court two or more years ago; or
(9) Prior sentences to incarceration78
At the conclusion of this automated pretrial process, the PSA provides predictions for three
pretrial outcomes relating to a defendant’s (1) risk of failure to appear (FTA), (2) risk for new
criminal activity (NCA), and (3) the risk for new violent criminal activity (NVCA). 79 The FTA
and NCA risks are provided on a scale of 1 to 6, with 6 being the highest. 80 The NVCA risk is
determined by the presence or absence of a “violence flag”.81 In addition to providing risk scores,
the PSA “recommends whether to release a defendant and what, if any, conditions of release to
impose.”82 Notably, the PSA’s assessment is not dispositive of a defendant’s pretrial fate because,
ultimately, it is the trial judge’s decision whether to release the defendant after considering the

76

Pretrial Justice Reform, supra note 27.
Id.
78 About the Public Safety Assessment, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RES. (last visited Apr. 7, 2021),
https://advancingpretrial.org/psa/factors/.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Robinson, 229 N.J. at 62.
77
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PSA in conjunction with other relevant information. 83 Where a determination is made to release a
defendant, the pre-trial services division oversees the conditions of release which “can range from
wearing an electric monitor to periodic check-ins with court staff, either in person or remotely. 84
G. Impact of New Jersey’s Bail Reform
In April 2019, New Jersey’s Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) released the
Report to the Governor and the Legislature regarding the early returns of the CJRA since its
implementation.85 The report found that the state’s pretrial population declined by 44% from the
end of 2015 to the end of 2018.86 An analysis of the jail population on October 3, 2018 revealed
that there were 6,000 fewer detainees than on the same date in 2012.87 Of those detained pretrial
on October 3, 2018, only 4.6% were being held on bail of $2,500 or less, down from 12% six years
prior.88 Meanwhile, defendants charged with or sentenced for at least one violent offense made up
47% of the detained population in 2018 compared to 35% on the same date in 2012, indicating that
fewer violent offenders were able to secure their release simply because they were able to afford
to post their bail, however expensive it may have been.89 Further, while the average defendant
spent 62.4 days in jail pretrial in 2014, that time had decreased 40% to 37.2 days in 2017. 90
The study also found that rates of recidivism and failure to appear for court increased very
slightly among defendants released pretrial. 91 In 2017, 26.9% of defendants released from jail
before their trials were charged with another new indictable offense, up from 24.2% in 2014.92
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Court appearance rates among the released defendants remained high but decreased slightly from
92.7% to 89.4% over the same period.93 Notably, state court officials stated that these increases of
2.7% and 3.3%, respectively, were “statistically insignificant” and that “small changes in outcome
measures should be interpreted with caution and likely do not represent meaningful differences.”94
Still, while the jail’s overall population has decreased, the report revealed that disparities
in the racial and ethnic makeup of the state’s jails remained the same. 95 While 3,000 fewer Black,
1,500 fewer White, and 1,300 fewer Hispanic defendants were detained pretrial in 2018 than on
the same date in 2012, Black men accounted for 54% of the state’s jail population at each juncture,
including after the bail reforms were instituted. 96 Markedly, the percentage of Black women
detained pretrial dropped from 44% to 34% over that time. 97 In the study, the AOC acknowledged
that “the overrepresentation of black males in the pretrial jail populations remains an area in need
of further examination by New Jersey’s criminal justice system as a whole.”98
IV.

NEW JERSEY’S BAIL REFORMS UNDER A MICROSCOPE

A. Assessing the Early Returns of NJ’s Reforms Against the Original Rationales
The degree to which one finds New Jersey’s bail reforms successful will hinge upon what
that person’s rationales and goals for the reforms were in the first place. A person interpreting
these early returns must be honest about what bail reform can realistically achieve to provide fair
and balanced analysis of the data.
Firstly, an individual seeking to prioritize the elimination of socioeconomic disparities with
respect to pretrial release determinations is likely very satisfied with the reform’s early returns.
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The statistics provided in the AOC report appear to demonstrate that the CJRA is effective in
addressing arbitrary distinctions in the system based on wealth. As such, “thousands of defendants
who have not been convicted of a crime and are presumed innocent under the law will be free to
remain with their families and their communities while they await their day in court.” 99 This not
only helps lower-income individuals continue to maintain their jobs, schooling, pay their rent, and
care for loved ones, but also exposes fewer people to the negative effects of serving time behind
bars strictly because they could not afford to pay the court. Fewer individuals being held pretrial
also means fewer instances of detained defendants facing unfair disadvantages in the system,
including higher rates of pleading guilty, being convicted, and receiving more prison sentences for
longer periods of time at trial.
Conversely, violent or higher-risk defendants who pose a threat to the community or
present a substantial flight risk may no longer be granted release simply because they could afford
to post their bail, however expensive it may be. That only 4.6% of pretrial detainees were being
held on bail of less than $2,500 in 2018, down from 12% from six years prior, is evidence of a
pretrial playing field that is leveling out.
Meanwhile, a person primarily concerned with reducing the overall pretrial jail population
in New Jersey would also find the AOC report encouraging. A 44% reduction in the overall pretrial
jail population within three years is an impressive accomplishment. The greater-than-25-day
reduction of the average amount of time defendants spent in jail pretrial from 2014 to 2018 was
also a triumph for the CJRA, indicating greater efficiency in the system.

Moreover, the

“statistically insignificant” increases in recidivism and missed court appearances among released
defendants appear to suggest that concerns of critics regarding the release of accused individuals
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were unfounded.100 Given these statistics, the study concluded that the PSA had been “remarkably
accurate” in assessing the risk to the community and of non-appearance posed by defendants.101
Not to be ignored, these illuminating findings also raise questions and concerns with respect to
past injustices that can no longer be corrected, why the previous system remained in place so long,
and why it is still used in the majority of jurisdictions around the country.
On the other hand, individuals, organizations, and legislatures primarily concerned with
addressing racial disparities in the makeup of New Jersey’s prison population would likely find
that the instituted reforms fell short of their goals. Despite the CJRA’s stated “fundamental mission
. . . to ensure all defendants are treated equally under the criminal justice system, regardless of
race, ethnicity, or gender”, the report found that Black men made up 54% of individuals detained
pretrial in 2017—a figure identical to the pre-CRJA numbers in 2012—despite making up only
15% of New Jersey’s population.102 In response to these findings, the ACLU acknowledged the
AOC’s “commitment to continue addressing racial disparities,” but affirmed that “[a] system that
reduces the number of incarcerated people but does not improve racial disparities is simply not
good enough.”103 The AOC conceded in the report that “the overrepresentation of black males in
the pretrial jail population remains an area in need of further examination by New Jersey’s criminal
justice system as a whole.”104
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Notably, the statistics regarding race reveal that there are issues within the justice system
that are seemingly beyond the purview of bail reform. That the disproportionate number of Black
men detained pretrial remained flat despite the reform’s successful reduction of the prison
population suggests that race-related inequalities in the system may be connected to already
existing racial disparities earlier in the criminal justice process. This theory invites a closer critique
of procedures that may have inconsistent race applications and implications during defendants’
initial interactions with police, at the booking stage, and at the charging stage. Specifically, there
is data to suggest that policing procedures such as stop-and-frisk disproportionately target Black
and Hispanic citizens.105 Further studies have shown that “Black defendants face significantly
more severe charges than whites, even after controlling for characteristics of the offense, criminal
history, defense counsel type, age and education of the offender, and crime rates and economic
characteristics of the jurisdiction.”106 The full causative nature of these areas requires further study
beyond the scope of this paper.
It is also important to recognize that the AOC, a division of the New Jersey Judiciary,
conducting a study of its own implementations of these reforms could leave room for bias, intended
or unintended, in the methodology of the study that could lead to skewed results and analysis. For
example, after Cook County, Illinois adopted new bail reform measures in 2017, the Office of the
Chief Judge of the Cook County Courts reviewed and reported on the effects of the measures two
years later.107 This study concluded that the release of thousands of defendants pretrial did not
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result in any increase in crime.108 However, a 2020 independent study of the Cook County reforms
conducted by two professors at the University of Utah College of Law (UUCL) refuted those
findings and reported a substantial increase in crime by pretrial releasees. 109 The study found that
new, violent crimes committed by releasees were largely undercounted, and raised questions as to
whether the bail reform measures conflicted with public safety priorities.110 While the authors were
not studying or interpreting New Jersey’s data, they dove deeply into the Cook County data to
discover and express concerns.
Similarly, some critics of the CJRA in New Jersey were quick to emphasize the increases
in the percentage of defendant releasees who were charged with new offenses while awaiting trial
(2.7% increase) and those who did not appear in court (3.3% increase), labeling the figures “noninsignificant” in direct contrast to the AOC’s interpretations.111 Further research, similar to the
UUCL study, critiquing the AOC’s methods and data analysis would go a long way to confirming
or disputing the AOC’s findings on New Jersey’s bail reforms.
B. Concerns with the Public Safety Assessment (PSA)
Regarding the CJRA’s ineffectiveness in addressing the disproportionate racial makeup of
New Jersey’s pretrial prison population, many criminal justice activists and organizations point to
the CRJA’s use of the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) as a reason for the perpetual disparities.
Critics of such algorithmic risk assessments include University of Georgia Law professor Sandra
Mayson, who notes that “[a]lgorithmic assessment carries a scientific aura, which can produce
unwarranted deference or a mistaken impression of objectivity.”112 Mayson challenges the
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objectivity of these practices, observing that “in a racially stratified world, any method of
prediction will project the inequalities of the past into the future.”113 Consequently, using past data
on arrest that disproportionately impacts Black individuals over White ones will result in
“predictive analysis [that] will project it to happen more frequently to Black people than to white
people in the future.”114 Notably, arrest rates in most places for nearly all crimes have shown racial
disparities for decades.115 As such, criminal history data is bound to be distorted and inherently
biased, which, in turn, will distort the findings and results of pretrial risk assessments.
These concerns about potential bias in the PSA led one prominent pretrial reform group to
rescind its support for New Jerseys bail reform. The Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) was instrumental
in New Jersey’s adoption of the PSA in 2014 and heavily advocated for its use across the nation
to reduce the ballooning prison population.116 In 2017 the PJI gave New Jersey’s bail system the
only “A” rating in the country.117 However, they revoked that grade in early 2020, finding that
such pretrial assessment tools are “derived from data reflecting structural racism and inequality
that impact our court and law enforcement policies and practices,” and that use of the data
perpetuates those racial inequalities.118 The PJI pointed specifically to the flat demographics of
New Jersey’s prison population despite the near elimination of cash bail in modifying their
evaluation of the state’s bail system.119
In addition to the PJI, more than 100 civil rights, digital justice, and community-based
organizations, including the ACLU and NAACP, signed a joint statement condemning the use of
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predictive pretrial risk assessment tools.120 The statement laid out civil rights concerns regarding
the data that is inputted into the system and gave recommendations for modifying the tools in
jurisdictions that already have them in place. 121 These suggestions included community
involvement in the design of the algorithms, as well as independent auditing of the tools to ensure
that the measures result in reducing jail populations and effectively address racial disparities.122
Lastly, there is little research to confirm exactly how the results and recommendations of
the PSA are used by judges.123 While PSA predictions are intended to “inform pretrial release
conditions” rather than be dispositive their own124 , whether judges rely on them entirely or ignore
them completely in making pretrial release decisions likely varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
and judge to judge.125 This makes collecting data on the use of the tools in courtrooms more
difficult to collect and analyze.126
On the other hand, in her paper, Mayson suggests that “the default alternative--subjective
risk assessment--is very likely to be worse.”127 Mayson points to recent studies that confirm that
“risk assessments completed using structured approaches produce estimates that are more reliable
and more accurate than unstructured risk assessments.”128 While algorithms can be examined and
analyzed, subjective assessments are less accountable and transparent and often contain their own
implicit or unconscious biases.129
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C. Other States’ Attempts at Bail Reform
New Jersey is not the only state that sought to implement reforms of their cash-bail system
in effort to reduce the prison population and alleviate racial and socio-economic disparities in the
penal system. Other states have made efforts to reduce or eliminate the use of cash bail with
differing legislation and varying results of success.
In New York, mandatory cash bail evaluations were eliminated for most misdemeanor and
non-violent felony charges as of the start of 2020.130 However, unlike New Jersey, New York
initially chose not to provide judges with ultimate discretion regarding whether a defendant poses
a threat to the public safety and should be detained pretrial. 131 While judges in the state were only
previously permitted to consider a defendant’s flight risk in setting their bail, many judges
previously still had discretion to set higher bail amounts for repeat offenders or individuals deemed
likely to commit another crime.132 New Jersey, on the other hand, requires that risk of flight and
potential danger to the community be considered in by judges in making pretrial release
determinations.133 Following heavy backlash prior to and just after the law took effect, after only
three months New York’s bail reform bill was amended to expand the number and types of crimes
for which judges could impose cash bail.134 The revised list included almost all violent felonies,
second degree burglary, sex offenses, and all charges alleged to have caused a person’s death.135
The amendments also expanded judges’ discretion, permitting them to consider a
defendant’s criminal history and status in setting cash bail and providing a wider selection of
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conditions—from travel restrictions to counseling—to be imposed on releasees.136 Further, despite
the expansion of bail-eligible offenses, a judge is not required to impose bail and may instead
choose to release defendants under one or more conditions. 137
Markedly, New York’s bail reform legislation did not adopt a risk-assessment tool.138
While the law does not prohibit or require the use of such methods, assessment used must be
“empirically validated and free from discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, or
any other protected class.”139 The lack of an adopted risk assessment tool was not an oversight, as
several organizations, including Citizen Action New York, actively advocated for their omission
in the reforms over concerns of inherent discrimination based on race and socioeconomic status.140
The balance between leveling an unfair bail system and ensuring public safety continues to be a
divisive political issue within the state.141
Meanwhile, in February 2021, Illinois became the first state to completely abolish the use
of cash bail to secure defendants’ release from jail pretrial. 142 The Illinois Pre-Trial Fairness Act
(725 ILCS 185) will take effect on July 1, 2021, but the elimination of cash bail will begin in
January 2023.143 Instead of cash bail, judges may detain a defendant where they “might willfully
flee from prosecution or if they are ‘a real and present threat to the safety of a specific, identifiable
person.’”144 As in New Jersey, judges will have final discretion to decide whether those conditions
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apply and a defendant should be held, though all pretrial hearings will begin with the assumption
that the defendant should be released.145
Still, despite efforts of some groups to ban the use of pretrial risk assessments, the tools
will be available to provide recommendations for Illinois judges in their pretrial detainment
deliberations, though their use is not mandated. 146 The algorithm’s recommendations are to be
used as suggestion only, and data about the algorithms will be published regularly. 147 The bill also
mandates that all results of any risk assessment must be forwarded to defense lawyers who may
rebut and challenge the findings.148 Moreover, skeptics of risk assessment tools are viewing the
bill with cautious optimism, as the legislation also includes prison reform, new guidelines for
training police, addressing the use of force, and a process for decertifying police officers who
commit misconduct.149 Ideally, these additional reforms will help alleviate causes of racial
disparity earlier in the criminal justice process.
Additionally, the Illinois reforms also regulate the use of electronic monitoring as a means
of surveillance, which advocates say is an “alternative form of incarceration” that can be just as
punitive, invasive, and restrictive as being put in jail.150 Prosecutors will bear the burden to prove
that the court has reason to monitor the releasee. 151 This proof must be offered prior to any
surveillance, and, if sufficient, is to be revisited after 60 days. 152 Further, in another legislative
first, a defendant’s time with an electric monitor will be considered time “served” and is to be
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subtracted from any court sentence.153 Overall, Illinois’ bail reform has “some of the strictest
restrictions on who can be incarcerated pretrial.”154
Conversely, though the California State Legislature approved a measure in 2018 that would
have abolished cash bail in the state, that legislation, Proposition 25, was defeated by voters at the
ballot box in the November 2020 election. 155 The law would have required those charged with
most misdemeanor offenses to be released from custody within 12 hours. 156 Other defendants
would have undergone risk assessments, with judges having final say over their release. 157 The
measure was heavily opposed by the bail industry, who spent more than $10 million on a campaign
to defeat it.158 Also, some advocates of bail reform such as the Human Rights Watch, also opposed
the bill, stating that it uses “racially biased risk assessment tools [and] gives judges nearly
unlimited discretion to incarcerate.”159
Undeterred, California lawmakers have continued to introduce bail reform bills aimed at
eliminating unfair bail practices and racial and socioeconomic disparities. 160 Two new bills would
move to “set bail at $0 for misdemeanors and ‘low-level felonies’ and require money to be
refunded if an arrestee makes all their court appearances, their charges are dropped, or their case
is dismissed.”161 Opponents of cash bail intend to continue to fight for bail reform in California
with “presumption of innocence as its guiding principle.”162
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V.

LOOKING AHEAD IN NEW JERSEY

A. Finding the Balance Between Harms Averted and Harms Imposed While Accounting
for Racial Disparities in the Justice System
Properly assessing the strengths and weaknesses and successes and failures of New
Jersey’s bail reform requires an honest assessment of the intended goals and realistic purview of
the endeavor. That Black men are still disproportionately represented in New Jersey prisons after
these reforms indicates that racial disparity in the justice system may be an issue outside the
purview of bail reform. This realization is valuable in that more attention can be focused on other,
earlier stages of criminal justice, including initial police interactions, the booking stage, and the
charging stage. The reforms’ ineffectiveness in this area may be disappointing, but it does not
mean that other goals were not achieved.
The early returns of the CJRA indicate that limiting the use of cash bail pretrial is an
effective means of reducing a ballooning prison population. It is also apparent that curbing the use
of cash bail as the predominant means of securing a defendant’s pretrial release helps level the
playing field for the less-wealthy and abates the use of wealth as an arbitrary and unfair determiner
of who may or may not go home to their families, communities, and jobs. The statistics show that
thousands of detainees could be released from prison while awaiting trial with “statistically
insignificant” increases in new crimes committed by releasees or failures to appear in court.
This balance of preventing future harms to society and imposing harms on defendants was
closely examined by University of Georgia School of Law professor Sandra Mayson and
University of Virginia School of Law professor Megan Stevenson. 163 Their research indicated two
general principles regarding pretrial detention: “(1) detention must avert greater harm (by
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preventing crime) than it inflicts (by depriving a person of liberty), and (2) prohibitions against
pretrial punishment mean that the harm experienced by the detainee cannot be discounted in the
cost-benefit analysis.”164 In their research, the professors asked respondents to “choose between
being the victim of certain crimes or being jailed for varying time periods.”165 The results indicated
that “even short periods of incarceration impose grave harms, such that a person must pose an
extremely high risk of serious crime in order for detention to be justified.” 166 People who are
detained risk losing their sources of income and, consequentially, their homes, cars, ability to care
for love ones, and the stability of their families and communities. These consequences experienced
by detainees and those connected to them are too impactful to ignore when weighing potential
harms of detention or release.167 New Jersey’s bail reforms, which resulted in the release of
thousands of defendants who may have otherwise been detained, is seemingly effective at
alleviating some of these concerns.
However, New Jersey’s regular practice of using of risk assessment tools- namely the
Public Safety Assessment- risks allowing racial inequalities earlier in the criminal justice process
to bleed into pretrial detention hearings and result in jailtime for additional defendants. The PSA’s
use of data regarding the legal histories of minority defendants- who are more likely to have police
interactions than their White counterparts- may be skewed due to preexisting injustices, which, in
turn, skews the results and recommendations of the PSA algorithm. New Jersey legislatures would
be wise to follow the lead of Illinois in taking steps to reform police training (including use of
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force guidelines), as well as measures to hold offending officers responsible for misconduct. These
actions could address some of the racial disparities that enter the system prior to the pretrial stage.
B. Auditing, Reporting, and Evolving
Further, New Jersey lawmakers should closely monitor the results of Illinois’ bail reforms
once they take hold in 2023. Results from the complete elimination of cash bail could lead to an
entirely new perspective on the lengths to which bail reform can safely go in limiting pretrial
detention without significant consequences. Illinois’ regulation of and restrictions on electronic
monitoring will also be worthy of close analysis, as the overuse of such conditions can prove just
as punitive and invasive as incarceration in some cases, effectively replacing one form of
surveillance with another. Illinois’ success in promoting liberty interests and saving money on
electronic monitoring equipment, maintenance, and supervision could prove promising for New
Jersey.
Finally, New Jersey must be diligent in appointing outside analysts and auditors to
consistently monitor and report on statistics coming from the New Jersey Judiciary. Not only must
there be fact-checks on the judiciary itself, but an outside perspective on the data coming from the
state’s court system and prisons is essential to promoting honesty and fairness. To demonstrate
full transparency and openness, and in the active pursuit of stated objectives, New Jersey would
be wise to appoint a committee of scholars, analysts, and criminal justice experts from outside the
state’s system to investigate and evaluate the bail and pre-trial detainment/release data provided
by the state judiciary and other official sources. Such analysis can remove concerns regarding
conflicts of interest in the release of state statistics while also providing valuable context for the
records. Also, independent studies, such as the 2020 review of the Cook County Court’s report on
bail reforms, can reveal inconsistencies, flaws, or discrepancies that will prove useful in designing
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subsequent legislation, but may have otherwise gone unrealized. Continuous reporting on the
statistics will enable lawmakers to keep track of encouraging or disconcerting trends in detainment
figures and consider and take courses of action to address and improve on the existing measures.
The goal of New Jersey’s bail reform should not be to merely replace a bad system with a less-bad
system, but to continuously improve and evolve into a more-perfect system that curbs unfairness
and inequality and promotes liberty and justice for all.
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